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Pp. 100. $25.95 cloth.

Giorgio Agamben’s recent book,
Profanations, unites seemingly disparate essays. However, even without being a student of his work, one
may single out a certain key theme
that runs across different disciplinary domains, including philosophy,
literature (and literary criticism),
and studies of the visual. I would
define this theme as the composition
of the subject. Indeed, the very first
essay in Agamben’s new book introduces readers to this problematic
by describing the tense and even
dramatic relationship between a
person’s Ego and his Genius, the
symbolic bearer and representation
of his fate. This is a field of forces
shaping each and every individual
when the personal is simultaneously
maintained and challenged by the
secret strength of the impersonal.
Such is physiological life, which, despite its striking closeness, remains
distant, nonconscious, and, for that
reason, out of control. Such are
the workings of emotion, which,
according to the theorist Gilbert
Simondon, is precisely a way of
relating to what remains of the preindividual within us. Agamben
clearly formulates the paradox: “Genius is our life insofar as it does not
belong to us” (13)—in other words,
insofar as it does not come into our
possession.
However, this other life is not
a matter of the individual alone.
In the essay titled “Special Being”
the author seems to extend his own
initial definition. “Special,” a word
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deriving from the Latin species (“appearance,” “aspect,” “vision”), stands
for a quality being displayed; it
is a mode of being that essentially
calls for sharing (or, in Agamben’s
terminology, offers itself “to common use” [59]). Since such being,
also defined as “whatever being”
(58), adheres to each of its qualities
but is not identified by them, it remains insubstantial. That is, it is not
a substance, but a desire for the
species of another, for its “habits” or
“ways” that reveal its perseverance
in its being—such is the clue to the
understanding of a being that, to
recall Jean-Luc Nancy, is a priori
“in common.” Although culture incessantly reduces the special to the
personal and thus invests it with
identity, special being cannot be an
object of personal property. Identity
is itself a powerful cultural apparatus. (Agamben here uses the Italian
word dispositivo, which brings to
mind Michel Foucault and his concept of biopower.)
Therefore, the subject as it is
defined and formed by impersonal
forces shares this composition with
others. Although Agamben does not
further dwell on his version of “being in common,” he goes on to
elaborate the specific relationship
between the personal and the impersonal by addressing the very nature
of the boundary that separates the
sacred from the profane. At this point
the relationship in question, full of
ambiguity, becomes truly dynamic.
It is epitomized in the figure of

homo sacer, a “sacred man,” who has
survived the very rite of separation:
belonging to the gods, he continues
to lead an obviously profane existence among his fellow men. However, his communication with other
men is fatally damaged. His position
is such that they may violently kill
him (restoring him, thus, to the
realm of the gods), and yet he cannot
be sacrificed, because he is no longer
part of the community. In sum, “in
the machine of sacrifice, sacred and
profane represent the two poles of a
system in which a floating signifier
travels from one domain to the other without ceasing to refer to the
same object” (78). For Agamben,
this is a question of use. Indeed, religion in general is about separating
things, places, humans, or animals
from their habitual functions and of
putting them to a use that is consecrated and, as such, uncommon.
Let us linger here for a moment,
especially since this thread of analysis results in Agamben’s formulating an open political task. In the
essay “In Praise of Profanation,”
which actually lends its name to the
book, profanation is seen as a way of
not only neutralizing the sacred (the
best example is provided by play)
but also of deactivating those apparatuses of power that, as I would
put it, capitalize on the separation
installed and maintained by religion.
Again, and even more clearly, it is a
question of use. Profanation seeks
to reestablish a “common use” (77)
of previously excluded spaces and
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objects. Such use has nothing to do
with consumption. On the contrary,
it indicates a relationship with something one can never actually “have”
or “possess”: things freed from their
very functionality. Concerning behavior, the new use would mean
extracting it “from its genetic inscription within a given sphere”
(85; the cat playing with a ball of
yarn, for example); in other words,
it would amount to transforming
activity into “a pure means” (86). The
old use, utilitarian and/or genetically preinscribed, therefore becomes
“inoperative.” Hence the political
task of profaning the unprofanable,
which is marked by its absolute
separation in the form of consumption or “spectacular exhibition” (82),
the twin aspects of the capitalist religion ubiquitously reigning in our
time.
The concept developed in this
essay is heavily influenced by JeanLuc Nancy and his notion of “inoperative community.” “Inoperative”
is the English word for désoeuvré,
which literally means “out of work.”
Nancy adopts the term from Maurice Blanchot and highlights precisely the overtones of idleness that
it carries; in his philosophical reflection, a “nonworking” community
is that which has neither identity
nor substance, and does not “betray”
itself in institutional forms. The
political stakes for addressing the
issue are high. How is it still possible
to speak (or think) of the revolution
and communism at a moment when

both seem to have been completely
discredited? Yet there is something
about human existence that these
phenomena tend to display: an initial connectedness, a being that is by
definition shared with the others.
Thus communism will always be a
manifestation of some basic truth
concerning ontological togetherness.
The examples that Giorgio Agamben gives (more than twenty years
after Nancy’s initial publication of
La communauté désoeuvrée) within
a slightly modified theoretical
framework are somewhat disconcerting. They are the possibility of
“profane defecation” and the brazen
faces of porn stars regarded as the
site for a “new form of erotic communication” (90). (One can hardly
imagine the consequences of returning feces, even if only a symbol, to
“common use” [87].) What accounts
for this apparent lowering of political stakes? Is it simply due to a shift
in the theme, or does it not show
signs of dominant theory becoming
more modest and docile, if not to say
opportunistic, these days?
What has been alluded to as the
impersonal in the composition of
subjectivity is elsewhere rendered as
life. This is made clear by Agamben’s analysis of Foucault’s study of
the lives of infamous men. Although
the passage is meant to elucidate
another concept, that of the death of
the author, it deserves independent
attention. What is of special interest
to Agamben is the point of intersection between actual lives and
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the discourse of anonymous scribes
whose task it was to register them.
This relationship is not one of representation, to be sure. In Foucault’s
words, the real lives were “played
out” (jouées) in the few sentences
that gave them legal expression.1
Taking on the ambiguous word
“jouer,” Agamben tries to work out
the ways in which life reverberates
in discourse. The infamous life that
belongs neither to juridical identity
nor to the functionaries of power “is
never possessed, never represented,
never said” (68). Instead, it is that
“inexpressive outer edge” (70) that
makes expression possible precisely
by emptying the core of this expression. This holds true for the author
as gesture. And this holds true for
the poem insofar as the author and
reader put themselves into play in
the text and likewise are withdrawn
from it. The recurrence to life allows
Agamben to sketch out the beginnings of an ethics: the latter is tightly linked to a life form whose ethos
coincides with perseverance in its
being.
A life, any life, life in general
played out—that is, lived at its utmost and for that reason remaining
inexpressible—is what makes expression possible. The essay “Parody” can be read as complementary to
“The Author as Gesture.” Here
Agamben explores the potential of
parody both as literary genre and
what is referred to in terms of a
“duplication of being” (49). Parody,
etymologically meaning a space

beside or next to the song (reserved
for speech or, more broadly, for language), is the only way of approaching a mystery, while the latter is the
only possible emblem of life. At least
this is what is suggested by the prose
of Elsa Morante. Parody is not only
a means of reconstructing an unnarratable object such as the innocent
life, but is also a form and practice
that is essentially liminal: it sustains
itself “on the threshold of literature”
and is “stubbornly suspended between reality and fiction, between
word and thing” (48). As such, it
constitutes a split in language, something that points to its outer dimension. Modeled on the ancient definition of parody, this space is called
“the being-beside-itself” (49) and has
to do with every living being as well
as every discourse. To put it differently, parody indicates the limits
of language, its inability to reach
the thing through the procedure
of naming, and yet, one might
conclude, there is nothing more
real than the thing that calls for
expression.
The two other themes that I
would single out are desire and
messianic time. Perhaps they end
up being one and the same or at
least combining into a fairly distinct
problematic. This problematic is introduced by means of the figure of
the helper, of which literature gives
abundant examples. Franz Kafka’s
compelling “assistants,” the famous
puppet Pinocchio, helpers of the
Messiah in the Arabic tradition, and
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Walter Benjamin’s hunchback are
the favored few of these examples.
What is it that unites all of these
incongruous beings? First of all, it
must be said that they belong to “a
complementary world.” Access to
this world is more than problematic
(“they cannot be helped” [30], but,
most important, help is not their
forte). Second, they perform a revelation. If in the case of wuzara’ (the
plural of wasir, the vizier) it is literally about translating the divine
language into the language of men,
the little hunchback in Benjamin
appears as spokesman of the forgotten. What he represents is that “ontological waste” (35) that we carry in
ourselves and that fails to surface in
memory or consciousness. However,
it is by remaining forgotten that the
insignificant tissue of our lives may
be redeemed. For Benjamin, the
Kingdom is already present, albeit
in despicable and distorted forms.
The helpers, then, are nothing but
“our unfulfilled desires” (34), which
will shine back on us on Judgment
Day.2
The other medium that Agamben chooses for his speculations on
time is, quite predictably, photography. The essay that explores the
theme is characteristically titled
“Judgment Day.” Although there is
no explicit mention of the nature of
the photograph, it turns out that it
resides in the gesture. The gesture
here may be interpreted as the
“monogram” of a person, of his or
her entire life.3 A gesture reproduced

in the photo may be mundane and
banal; however, because of the intervention of the camera, it assumes an
eschatological meaning: what is captured in its historicity and singularity is displayed as if on Judgment
Day itself. According to this reading, it would seem that “the angel of
photography” (24) unites the two
modes of time by way of a rupture.
Indeed, the photograph is “the site
of a gap . . . between the sensible and
the intelligible, between copy and
reality, between a memory and a
hope” (26). Messianic time thus
imprinted in the image corresponds
to the exigency emitted by every
photograph: it demands that all forgotten lives should be named and
remembered.
This temporal sketch inspired by
Walter Benjamin is essentially another take on the impersonal, this
time from an ethical perspective. We
are interpellated by that which we
do not possess, which goes beyond
the boundaries of time and lived
experience. I would call this the
exigency of life, and if I am right in
my interpretation, I do share the
overall message. In fact, one can
hardly disagree with the various
thoughts and insights collected in
Profanations, the more so that they
are rendered poetically, in a lyrical
tone. But a strange shadow hovers
over this intimacy. The reader is
lulled into a sweet contemplation of
varying cultural texts and phenomena. And it seems that theory itself
quietly transforms into a bagatelle.
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What are the risks involved in the
present undertaking? What is the
“outer edge” of the sophisticated
form it adopts? Is the community
whose echo it presumably articulates
inclusive or exclusive? The book
provides no answers to those questions, even if the problems that it
touches on are clearly acute.
—Institute of Philosophy,
Russian Academy of Sciences
NOTES
1.

See Michel Foucault, “Lives of
Infamous Men,” in Power, ed. James
D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley
(New York: New Press, 2000), 160
(translation emended).

2.

For a direct connection between desires
and their fulfillment at the end of time,
see the short essay “Desiring” in
Agamben’s Profanations.

3.

Monogram is a term that comes from
Siegfried Kracauer. He juxtaposes the
“last image” of a person’s life as
memory retains it to the photograph,
which represents only a set of scattered
fragments related to that human being.

